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We demonstrate a client-server quantum key distribution (QKD) scheme. Large resources such as laser
and detectors are situated at the server side, which is accessible via telecom fiber to a client requiring only
an on-chip polarization rotator, which may be integrated into a handheld device. The detrimental effects of
unstable fiber birefringence are overcome by employing the reference-frame-independent QKD protocol
for polarization qubits in polarization maintaining fiber, where standard QKD protocols fail, as we show
for comparison. This opens the way for quantum enhanced secure communications between companies
and members of the general public equipped with handheld mobile devices, via telecom-fiber tethering.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevLett.112.130501 PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Vf, 42.50.Ar, 42.50.Ex
The principle of quantum mechanics that requires micro-
scopic systems to be changed upon observation has per-
plexed physicists since its formulation, yet understanding
that the effect could be harnessed as a resource gave birth
to the field of quantum cryptography [1–13]. Quantum
enhanced security in communication is available through
quantum key distribution (QKD), which exploits the behav-
iour of single photons to allow two parties to exchange
the binary string, or key, that is used in the encryption of
sensitive information. Now implementable with current
technologies [14–16], QKD has matured to the stage where
it is moving from research laboratories towards commercial
applications [17]. Here we demonstrate the feasibility of
equipping mobile communication devices with quantum
cryptographic capabilities by making a QKD server acces-
sible over a telecom fiber, to which a client may tether.
The transmission of quantum information, suitable for
QKD,normally requires that a state sent byAlice is faithfully
received by Bob, unless an eavesdropper, Eve, observes the
state and reveals her presence as an otherwise unexplainable
disturbance. Yet even in the absence of Eve, an unstable
fiber communication link or instability in the sending and
receiving apparatus, is equivalent to an unknown or varying
reference frame, and has the effect of unhelpfully trans-
forming the states that Bob receives [18].
Attempts to overcome potential reference frame misalig-
nment by encoding qubits within larger systems [19–21]
require creation, manipulation, and detection of many-
photon entangled states, which is technically challenging
and very loss-sensitive. Encoding information into the
modes available from the transverse spatial profile of light
[22–25], may facilitate communication between misaligned
parties, through air or vacuum, but encounters problems
such as mode dispersion when transmitting through fiber.
Protocols that exploit the arrival time of photons as a logical
basis necessitate stable interferometers to perform encoding
and decoding, requiring active stabilization in fiber [26], or
precise temperature regulation in on-chip QKD with highly
asymmetric interferometers [27].
An alternative time-multiplexing scheme is the plug-and-
play system which sends each light pulse back and forth
along the same fiber, with the aid of a Faraday mirror, to
cancel the effects of birefringence [28–32]. Interferometric
stability results from both halves of the time-split pulse
retracing each other’s path. A drawback to this double-pass
arrangement is the potential for an increased error rate due
to Rayleigh backscattering, which requires the addition of a
storage line to hold a train of pulses which must complete a
round trip before the next train is sent. A further stability
constraint, related to the length of transmission, is that
fluctuations in the fiber and interferometer should be slow
on the time scale of the double pass.
The reference frame independent QKD protocol
(rfiQKD) [33–36], deployed here, operates between
unknown and changing reference frames, is independent
of any particular choice of apparatus or information
encoding, requires no entanglement, and is implementable
with two-level systems encoded onto single photons that
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may be approximated with weak coherent laser pulses,
making it intrinsically practical. The protocol will generate
a secret key as long as the rate of change between reference
frames is slow on the rate of particle repetition.
With freedom to choose the physical two-state encoding
and no requirement for phase stability, the rfiQKD protocol
allowed us to exploit commercially available lithium
niobate integrated polarization controllers [37] to imple-
ment QKD with photon-polarization qubits over an unsta-
bilized fiber link. Larger resources, such as the photon
source and superconducting detectors [38,39], are situated
on Bob’s side, which can be regarded as the server side,
while Alice, as the client, requires only the capability to
performsingle qubit operations. The scenario is one inwhich
the client tethers a hand held device, with an integrated
photonic chip, to a telecom fiber to receive dim laser pulses
from the QKD server, which the client attenuates to the
single photon level, before encoding each pulse with a qubit
of information for return transmission to the server, along a
different fiber.
Here, we demonstrate a stable, constant, and continu-
ously positive secret key rate over the unstabilized fiber link
using the rfiQKD protocol, while the rate for the BB84
QKD protocol falls. We go on to show that our rfiQKD
system automatically and passively recovers from the
deliberate introduction of large amounts of noise in the
form of rapid fluctuations.
Although formulated as an entanglement-driven proto-
col, rfiQKD can be implemented with weak coherent
states that sufficiently approximate single photons, where
Alice randomly prepares and sends the polarization states
fD=A;R=L;H=Vg corresponding to the eigenvectors of
the Pauli matrices, which we label as fX; Y; Zg [40]. In our
experiment, the requirement of one known and stable basis,
used to encode the key, is fulfilled with the horizontal (H)
and vertical (V) polarization states, which are preserved
throughout transmission in polarization maintaining fiber
(PMF). The other four states, superpositions of H and V
used to guarantee security, are unhelpfully transformed by
phase fluctuations in PMF due to environmental influences
on the birefringence of the fiber; while this effect is
troublesome for other protocols, rfiQKD operates in the
presence of phase drifts that are slow on the repetition rate
of sent photons. For fluctuations sufficiently rapid to force
protocol failure, rfiQKD will automatically recover in
calmer periods without the need for realignment, as we
demonstrate.
The operation of the protocol, with its phase invariant
security measure, works as follows. Expressing Alice and
Bob’s measurement bases as ZA ¼ ZB, XB ¼ cosðβÞXAþ
sinðβÞYA, and YB ¼ cosðβÞYA − sinðβÞXA, where β slowly
changes with time in an unknown way, Alice randomly
prepares quantum states which she sends to Bob, who
measures in his randomly chosen basis; later they publicly
reveal their choice of bases. The raw key is obtained when
they both measure in the Z direction, providing a quantum
bit-error rate,
Q ¼ 1 − hZAZBi
2
: (1)
The other two slowly rotating bases are used to estimate
the knowledge of a potential Eve. The quantity
C ¼ hXAXBi2 þ hXAYBi2 þ hYAXBi2 þ hYAYBi2; (2)
is independent of the relative angle β. If there is no Eve and
the communication channel is ideal with a fixed (although
unknown) phase, then the correlation function hZAZBi is
equal to 1 whereas hXAXBi, hXAYBi, hYAXBi, and hYAYBi
each take a constant value between−1 and 1 determined by
β. Also, hZAXBi, hZAYBi, hXAZBi, and hYAZBi should be
zero as X, Y, and Z are mutually unbiased. With Z bases
aligned, Q ¼ 0 and C ¼ 2 will be achieved, but in a
realistic implementation, Q will be greater than zero and
C will be less than 2.
The correlation functions involved in (1) and (2) are
calculated from the rates of photon detections by assigning
positive or negative signs to correlated or anticorrelated
detections, respectively. For example, if Bob labels his pair
of detectors as b ¼ f0; 1g, while Alice labels the pair of
FIG. 1 (color online). Experimental setup for client-server
rfiQKD. The server side holds a telecom wavelength
(1550 nm) laser with a 1 MHz pulse generator (PG) and fixed
polarizer, to send light pulses to the client through a polarization
maintaining fiber (PMF). At the client side, an integrated
polarization controller (PC) encodes qubits into the polarization
of the attenuated (Att.) light. A fiber beam splitter (FBS) and
photodetector (PD) continuously monitor power for malicious
attacks. Qubits received back at the server side are measured with
a similar PC, fiber polarizing beam splitter (FPBS), and super-
conducting single photon detectors (SSPDs), all controlled by an
electronic board synchronization (Sync.), function programmable
gate array (FPGA), and processor. The Bloch sphere illustrates
the effects of an unstable environment on polarization.
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states she sends (within a particular basis) as a ¼ f0; 1g
then the hABi expectation value is calculated from the
number of detector clicks nab as ðn00 þ n11 − n01 − n10Þ=
ðn00 þ n11 þ n01 þ n10Þ, which is essentially the normal-
ized difference between correlated and anticorrelated
detections.
The security proof of the rfiQKD protocol [33] shows
that when Q≲ 15.9%, Eve’s information is given by
EðQ;CÞ ¼ ð1 −QÞh

1þ ~u
2

þQh

1þ vð ~uÞ
2

; (3)
where
~u≡ umax ¼ min
 ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
C=2
p
1 −Q ; 1

;
v ¼ 1
Q
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
C=2 − ð1 −QÞ2u2max
q
;
and the hðxÞ is the binary entropy. The secret key rate is
given by
r ¼ 1 − hðQÞ − EðQ;CÞ: (4)
The experimental setup is shown in Fig. 1. At the
server side, light from a 1550 nm continuous-wave laser
source is sent through a pulse generator (PG) to produce
pulses of 100 ns width with a repetition rate of 1 MHz,
which are filtered by a horizontal polarizer and transmitted
to the client through PMF. At the client side, a fiber beam
splitter and photodetector expose hypothetical attacks (for
example, [41]). A ≈75 dB attenuator reduces the light
intensity to the single photon level of ≈0.1 photons per
pulse so that the probability of more than one photon per
pulse ≈ 0.005. The client randomly prepares among the
six polarization states fD;A; R; L;H; Vg using a LiNbO3
[42,43] polarization controller (PC) commanded from a
field programmable gate array (FPGA) and associated
driver circuits. Photonic qubits are returned to the server,
along another unstabilized 5 m length of PMF, where a
similar PC and FPGA, together with a fiber polarization
beam splitter and superconducting single photon detectors,
perform projective measurements chosen randomly among
the three relevant bases. With the efficiency of the SSPDs
at 10%, the final average repetition rate is 10 kHz.
All system elements are synchronized to the SYNC-
FPGA platform, which allows for precise timing of all
stages within the transmission period. Each repetition
begins with an optical pulse from the server side PG;
when the pulse arrives at the client PC, it is set to prepare a
particular polarization state; then, timed appropriately for
the return of the pulse, the server PC is set to measure in a
particular basis; finally, the state of the detectors is recorded
by the FPGA.
In addition to demonstrating the feasibility of QKD
between telecom-fiber-linked integrated photonic devices
in the described client-server scheme, we aim to show two
features of the rfiQKDprotocol that are particularly relevant:
robustness to phase drift which is inevitable in long-range
fiber and automatic passive recovery from rapid noise.
We also present analysis for the uncalibrated variant
urfiQKD protocol, which assumes not only unaligned
reference frames but also removes the assumption for
alignment within a reference frame, allowing for non-
orthogonality within a basis and mutual bias between bases,
and differing detector efficiencies that arise in a real-world
FIG. 2 (color online). Experimental data for secret key rate
fraction r showing robustness to drift. Data are initially collected
in the situation of well aligned client-server reference frames, but
the unfixed PMF quantum channel is subject to ambient envi-
ronmental influences, which effect a slowly varying reference
frame. While the key rate for the rfiQKD protocols is constant, for
BB84 it suffers a fall as the alignment drifts. Lower bounds on
the secret key rate from the urfiQKD analysis are shown.
FIG. 3 (color online). Experimental data for secret key rate
fraction r showing automatic recovery from rapid noise. During
the initial 60 s, the unaligned and slowly varying reference frames
result in BB84 failure while the rfiQKD protocols operate.
Between t ¼ 60 s and t ¼ 120 s we deliberately introduced rapid
PMF deformations to force an rfiQKD failure. However, an
automatic and passive revival of r for the rfiQKD protocols is
observed during the subsequent calm period.
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implementation [35]. This is achieved by using an explicit
device model and minimizing the key rate over possible
model parameters.
We demonstrated drift robustness of the rfiQKD and
urfiQKD generated key rates in comparison with that of
BB84, beginning key exchange with well aligned client-
server reference frames, so that states prepared by the client
PC had a high fidelity with projectors determined by the
server PC. The PMF quantum channel was unfixed but
undisturbed for the duration of the key exchange, subject
only to ambient environmental influences. Figure 2 shows
the secret key rate fraction, r, as a function of time for the
BB84, rfiQKD, and urfiQKD protocols. The duration of
key exchange is 240 s, so each of the 24 points corresponds
to data integrated over 10 seconds, which is long enough
to collect sufficient data to produce small error bars,
corresponding to a precision of three standard deviations,
but short enough to avoid significant depletion of the value
of r, from integration over largely different values β. For
clarity, these error bars are not displayed, instead we show
the lower bound on r from the urfiQKD analysis. While the
secret key fraction for BB84 falls as a function of time, the
rfiQKD protocols maintain a secret key fraction of
≈ 0.44–0.49.
We demonstrated the automatic, passive recovery
capability of our system after periods of rapid and sub-
stantial noise that force a protocol failure. Figure 3 shows r
as a function of time for 24 points, each corresponding
to 10 seconds of data, as before. During the initial 60 s of
key exchange, the PMF quantum channel is unfixed and
undisturbed but unaligned so that the BB84 protocol
immediately fails. However the changes resulting from
the ambient environment are slow enough for the rfiQKD
protocols to operate successfully. Between t ¼ 60 s and
t ¼ 120 s we deliberately introduced a large amount of
noise by continually and significantly deforming the PMF
to simulate a rapidly changing reference frame, forcing r to
fall below zero. At t ¼ 120 s, the noise ceases and as the
PMF relaxes from the mechanical strains, a positive key
rate automatically returns and achieves initial values for the
rfiQKD protocols. In contrast, BB84 achieves a positive r
only in brief transitionary periods of near-alignment.
Again, the lower bound on r for the urfiQKD analysis is
displayed.
In conclusion, we demonstrated a client-server QKD
protocol where all large resources reside at server side, and
the client requires only an integrated photonic device that
could be further integrated into a hand held communication
device. The key is exchanged though a PMF telecom-fiber
tether using the rfiQKD protocol, that is shown to be
passively robust to typical environmental drift effects and
can automatically recover from large noise levels to re-
establish QKD in calmer periods with no requirement for
alignment. As is the case for other QKD schemes, photon
loss becomes an issue as fiber length increases, leading to a
potential photon number splitting (PNS) attack [44] for a
photon source of weak coherent pulses. Considering the
PMF loss rate of approx 0.5 dB=km in our proof of
principle demonstration, even with high efficiency detec-
tors [45,46], key exchange would be limited to a few km
before a true single photon source [47] or decoy state
strategies [48] are required to maintain security against
PNS attacks. In addition, a comparative study of the effect
of phase noise for security in different protocols as fiber
length increases would be useful.
Here, rfiQKD is used to facilitate key exchange with
polarization encoding in integrated photonic devices, yet
the protocol itself is independent of any particular choice
of encoding or apparatus. We were able to immediately
exploit off-the-shelf components such as PMF and com-
mercial polarization controllers to realize client QKD
hardware, and we expect that the features demonstrated
here will apply generally. In particular the adoption of the
rfiQKD protocol in commercially available systems could
simplify their operation.
Miniaturization of QKD devices is integral to the wide-
spread adoption of QKD and our results pave the way for
quantum enhanced security for the general public with
handheld mobile devices. Future directions are to develop
time multiplexing with rfiQKD to avoid the requirement
for temperature-stabilized Mach Zehnder interferometers,
allow for fiber fluctuations between Alice and Bob, and
for drift between interferometers local to Alice and Bob.
A time multiplexed rfiQKD system would be well suited
to take advantage of existing (non-PMF) telecom-fiber
networks.
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